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The ability to infer intentions of other agents, called
theory of mind (ToM), confers strong advantages
for individuals in social situations. Here, we show
that ToM can also be maladaptive when people
interact with complex modern institutions like finan-
cial markets. We tested participants who were in-
vesting in an experimental bubble market, a situation
in which the price of an asset is much higher than its
underlying fundamental value. We describe a mech-
anism by which social signals computed in the dor-
somedial prefrontal cortex affect value computations
in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, thereby increasing
an individual’s propensity to ‘ride’ financial bubbles
and lose money. These regions compute a financial
metric that signals variations in order flow intensity,
prompting inference about other traders’ intentions.
Our results suggest that incorporating inferences
about the intentions of others when making value
judgments in a complex financial market could lead
to the formation of market bubbles.
INTRODUCTION
In February 1637 in Amsterdam, the cost of a single exotic tulip
bulb reached a price equal to ten times what a skilled craftsman
earned in a year. The price of the same bulb collapsed a few days
later. The dramatic rise and fall of tulip bulb prices is a famous
historical example of a financial bubble (Kindleberger and Aliber,
2005). A bubble is conventionally defined by active trading of an
asset at prices that are considerably higher than its intrinsic
fundamental value. Examples of modern bubbles include Japa-
nese stocks in the 1990s, the US high-tech sector in the late
1990s, and housing prices, which rose and crashed in many
countries from 2000–2008. All of these bubbles (especially the
housing crash) caused long-lasting macroeconomic disruptions
(Shiller, 2005).
Modern bubble episodes have also led to a substantial shift in
thinking about the capacity of prices to act as sober information1222 Neuron 79, 1222–1231, September 18, 2013 ª2013 The Authoraggregation mechanisms that guide efficient allocation of capi-
tal. Policy makers, academics, and market participants alike
are now more familiar with, and groping to understand, the
ways that prices can reflect pathological valuation and are
actively debating whether policy interventions can help (Akerlof
and Shiller, 2009).
Despite these dramatic historical andmodern examples, there
is no well-accepted theory of how bubbles start and end. One
common definition of bubbles is rapid price appreciation fol-
lowed by a crash (Brunnermeier, 2008). However, this definition
has no predictive power for identifying an ongoing bubble, since
it does not identify a bubble before it crashes. Furthermore,
fundamental asset values are rarely known with precision, so it
is difficult to identify a bubble if bubbles are defined as prices
above an elusive fundamental value.
One way to learn about bubbles is to observe trading in an
experimental market for artificial assets that have a known
fundamental value. In these markets, price variation cannot be
explained by changes in fundamentals. In fact, several carefully
controlled economics experiments have shown that certain clas-
ses of asset markets do generate price bubbles quite regularly,
even when intrinsic values are easy to compute and are known
to traders (Smith et al., 1988; Camerer and Weigelt, 1993; Porter
and Smith, 2003; Lei et al., 2004). The nature of bubbles has also
been intensely investigated in theory (Abreu and Brunnermeier,
2003; Yu and Xiong, 2011), but empirical reasons why bubbles
arise and then crash are still not well understood in economics
(Xiong, 2013).
Recent work in neuroeconomics has shown how financial
decision theory can be informed by neuroscientific data (Bos-
saerts, 2009). In particular, studies have started to dissect the
neural mechanisms by which risk processing (Preuschoff et al.,
2008), anticipatory affect (Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007; Kuhnen
and Knutson, 2005), fictive learning signals (Lohrenz et al., 2007),
inference about information possessed by other traders (Brugu-
ier et al., 2010), and mental accounting of trading outcomes (C.
Frydman, personal communication) shape financial decisions.
However, the neural mechanisms underpinning the formation
of a financial bubble are still unknown. Understanding of these
mechanisms could prove critical in distinguishing between alter-
native hypotheses, each requiring different macroeconomic
interventions.s
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Theory of Mind Biases Values in Financial BubblesThis study, which combines experimental finance settings
together with behavioral modeling and neuroimaging methods,
aims to identify the neural coding scheme at the core of bubble
formation. We focus here on how the representation of assets
trading values in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a brain
region heavily involved in representing goal value (Rangel et al.,
2008; Boorman et al., 2009; Chib et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2009;
Levy and Glimcher, 2012), are modulated by formation of a
bubble. Our hypothesis is that the increase in prices observed
in bubble markets is associated with the neural representation
of inflated trading values in vmPFC,whichproduces anenhanced
susceptibility to buying assets at prices exceeding their funda-
mental value. We test the hypothesis that the inflated values are
caused by participants’ maladaptive attempts to forecast the in-
tentions of other players in a fast-growing market. In particular,
we propose that the more dorsal portion of the prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC), a region well known to represent the mental state of
other individuals (also known as theory of mind; ToM) (Frith and
Frith, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Hampton et al., 2008), is
involved in updating the value computation in vmPFC, stimulating
the formation of a financial bubble. In order to clarify the role
played by intentions in modulating activity in these brain regions
during financial bubbles, we introduce a computational concept
from financial theory. This metric captures the dynamic changes
from a steady, regular arrival of buying and selling orders to a
more variable arrival process (perhaps signaling the start of a
bubble, as orders arrive rapidly due to excitement, or an impend-
ing crash, when orders arrive slowly as traders hold their breath)
that can signal the presence of strategic agents in a market. Ac-
tivity in medial prefrontal regions is correlated with this index
more strongly in bubble markets than in nonbubble markets
and is associated with the individual’s propensity to ride the
financial bubble.
RESULTS
Experimental Markets
Twenty-one participants were scanned while trading in experi-
mental markets. Trading activity in six actual experimental mar-
kets (collected in previous behavioral studies; Porter and Smith,
2003) was replayed over a 2-day scanning schedule. On each
day, the participants traded in three experimental markets.
Each market was divided into fifteen trading periods. During
each trading period, the scanned participants observed a fast-
motion visual representation of the prices of offers to sell (asks)
and offers to buy (bids), which were actually inputted by the
participants who had taken part in the original behavioral
experiments.
Subjects started with a cash endowment of $60. The screen
was frozen at random intervals (2–3 times each period). At these
freeze points, participants were allowed to stay (do nothing) or
buy or sell one, two, or three shares at the current market price
by pressing a keypad. After the choice was inputted, an update
of the participants’ portfolio (number of the shares held and cash)
was presented on the screen. This was followed by a variable
resting phase. At the end of each of the fifteen periods, the
trading activity was interrupted, and participants were shown
the dividend paid to the shareholder for that period.NeuThe traded assets paid a dividend worth an expected value of
$0.24 in each period to subjects who held those assets. There-
fore, the intrinsic expected value of buying and holding assets
was initially $3.60. The assets’ intrinsic value (fundamental value)
declined by $0.24 after each period (since there were fewer
future dividends lying ahead). The asset value in period t was
therefore $0.24 3 (15  t + 1) (see Experimental Procedures
for more details).
Three of the six sessions used in the study were nonbubble
markets; in those sessions, the market prices were tracking
the fundamental value of the asset closely (Figure 1A). The other
three sessions were bubblemarkets, in whichmarket prices rose
well above the intrinsic value in later periods (Figure 1B; Figure S1
available online).
Behavioral Results
Our initial approach was to quantify how participants’ choices
(i.e., buy, sell, or stay) were influenced by market parameters
such as bid and ask prices and fundamental values. We per-
formed an ordered logistic regression using participants’
choices (i.e., buy, sell, or stay) as dependent variables and mar-
ket prices and fundamental values as independent variables. The
parameter estimates showed that in both the bubble and non-
bubble markets, the participants’ behavior was significantly
modulated by prices and fundamental values, but that those
two factors explained less variance in the bubble markets data
(pseudo R2 = 0.27; Bayesian information criterion [BIC] =
2,089) than in nonbubble (pseudo R2 = 0.33; BIC = 1,840).
Notably, there was a significant difference between bubble and
nonbubble market coefficients computed for prices (t test: t =
3.48; p < 0.05) and for fundamental value (t test: t = 4.24; p <
0.001). Coefficients for prices and fundamentals together with
a summary statistics are presented in Table 1. These results sug-
gest that during financial bubbles, participants’ choices are less
driven by explicit information available in the market (i.e., prices
and fundamentals) and are more driven by other computational
processes, perhaps imagining the path of future prices and likely
behavior of other traders.
To further investigate this issue, we measured how the neural
representation of value changes when participants trade assets
in bubble markets compared with nonbubble markets (using
fMRI). Our hypothesis was that the increased trade volume in
bubble markets should be associated with an inflated represen-
tation of portfolio profits. We reasoned that if the formation of
bubbles is a consequence of inflated value representation, a
brain region that codes for parametric changes in trading values
should have increased activity when participants trade in bubble
markets.
Value Computation
To test this hypothesis, we constructed a parametric variable
that captured the trial-by-trial variance in the value of each par-
ticipant’s trading position. We called this variable current portfo-
lio value (CPV), a combination of the value in cash and in shares
held by a participant (or trader) at each point in time (CPV[t] =
cash + [shares 3 fundamental value at time t]). CPV was used
as a parametric regressor in a general linear model to isolate
changes in blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signalron 79, 1222–1231, September 18, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 1223
Figure 1. Task
(A) Structure of the task: at the beginning of each period, participants were shown amessage stating the period number and the value of their portfolio (shares and
cash). This was followed by a video showing an intuitive graphical replay of the order (asks and bids) and trade flow. The orders were arranged by price level (see
illustrative diagram on the right corner). Whenever a trade occurred, the best bid (if a sale) or best ask (if a purchase) briefly (0.5 s) changed color to green, after
which the circle disappeared. The circles constantly rearranged to ensure that the best bid and ask circles were closest to the midpoint of the screen (for more
details see Bruguier et al., 2010). After a variable time interval (3–6 s), the screenwas frozen for 5 s, and subjects used their initial endowment of $60 to either buy or
sell (1, 2, or 3 shares) or stay by pressing a keypad. At the end of the choice period, an update screen summarized their current portfolio (i.e., cash and shares).
This was followed by a resting period (3–6 s). At the end of each period (15 periods in total), a dividendwas randomly extracted from (0¢ 8¢ 28¢ 60¢), and subjects
paid for the number of shares held (in the case of short selling, subjects had to pay the cost of the dividend for the number of negative shares held). The dividend
for that period was displayed to the subjects with an update of their portfolio.
(B and C) Asks (red) and bid (blue) plotted against the fundamental prices (dotted line) for one of the three nonbubble markets (B) and one of the three bubble
markets (C) replayed during the experiment. In the nonbubble markets condition (B), asks and bids track the fundamental price over time, while in the bubble
markets condition (C), asks and bids deviate from the fundamental prices. All six of the markets used in the study are plotted in the Supplemental Information.
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Theory of Mind Biases Values in Financial Bubblesunderpinning the increased representation of trading values dur-
ing bubble markets compared to nonbubble markets. This anal-
ysis yielded a significant interaction in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC peak [3, 53, 2], t = 3.48; p < 0.05 small volume
correction [SVC] for multiple comparison), a brain region that
plays a key role in encoding the goal values that are used to
guide choice (Figure 2A; for a complete list of activations see
also Figure S1). We therefore confirmed, consistent with our
initial hypothesis, that the parametric representation of the port-
folio value (CPV) was increased during bubble markets. This is
illustrated by the pattern of activity in vmPFC (percent BOLD
signal changes) in response to increasing levels of CPV in both
bubble and nonbubble markets (Figure 2B).1224 Neuron 79, 1222–1231, September 18, 2013 ª2013 The AuthorWe next reasoned that if inflated trading values represented in
vmPFC play a role in the formation of a financial bubble, activity
in this region should predict the behavioral tendency to buy
shares when their prices are above the fundamental values (a
behavior that stimulates and sustains the formation of a financial
bubble). To test this, we constructed an independent parameter
that quantified the participants’ tendency to ride the bubble. We
called this between-subject index ‘‘bubble susceptibility,’’ which
is the extra price paid by participants to purchase shares at pri-
ces above the fundamental value (see Experimental Procedures
for more details).
We then entered this bubble susceptibility index as a be-
tween-subjects covariate in the parametric general linear models
Table 1. Ordinal Logistic Regression
Market Parameter Bubble Markets Nonbubble Markets
Prices 0.011 (±0.002)* 0.020 (±0.004)*
Fundamental values 0.009 (±0.001)** 0.02 (±0.004)**
Summary Statistics Bubble Markets Nonbubble Markets
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.33
Bayesian information
criterion (BIC)
2,089 1,840
The dependent variable is an ordered variable (buy, stay, sell). The SEM
is reported within parentheses; bubble versus nonbubble markets:
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001.
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Theory of Mind Biases Values in Financial Bubbles(GLM) model described above. This analysis yielded a signifi-
cant correlation in vmPFC (peak [6, 50, 1]; t = 3.44; p < 0.05
SVC for multiple comparisons). More precisely, activity in
vmPFC was a significant predictor of the behavioral tendency
to ride bubbles (Figure 3). Note that while the overall buying at
prices above the fundamental value was a relatively rare phe-
nomenon (see Figures S2 and S3), riding the bubble (in the
context of our experimental setup) was clearly a suboptimal
behavior, as demonstrated by the fact that those participants
with high susceptibly to ride the bubble had significantly lower
monetary earnings (p = 0.02), an effect due to only trading in
bubble markets (nonbubble markets: p > 0.1; bubble markets:
p = 0.005). Critically, low monetary earnings did not directly
correlate with activity in vmPFC (p = 0.19), excluding the possi-
bility that the correlation we identified in this region reflected
increasing susceptibility to reduced earnings (independent of
bubble susceptibility).
Theory of Mind
Our next step was to investigate the mechanism causing the
inflation in value representation observed in vmPFC during finan-
cial bubbles. The key difference between nonbubble markets
and bubble markets is that in nonbubble markets, the value of
a share is only determined by the fundamental value of the asset,
while in bubble markets, profitable trading depends on accu-
rately judging the intentions of other players in themarket. There-
fore, we hypothesized that the increase in value representation
during a bubble market was a consequence of the fact that
traders use inferences about the intentions and mental states
of other agents to update their value representation. This hypoth-
esis was supported by the fact that in our whole-brain analysis,
together with increased activity in vmPFC, we isolated a network
of brain regions that have previously been associated with theory
of mind (Siegal and Varley, 2002; Frith and Frith, 2006; Saxe,
2006), such as temporoparietal junction (L-TPJ; [48, 52, 25],
t = 3.68), precuneus ([6, 43, 49], t = 4.9), and dorsomedial
PFC (dmPFC; [9, 50, 28], t = 3.47) (Figure 3A; for a complete
list of activations see also Table S1).
In particular, we focused on dmPFC because convergent evi-
dence suggests that this region of the prefrontal cortex plays a
primary role in human ability tomake inferences about themental
states (including intentions) of other agents (Siegal and Varley,
2002; Amodio and Frith, 2006), enabling strategic thinking
(Hampton et al., 2008). Furthermore, a previous study has shownNeuthat in experimental financial markets, activity in this area corre-
lates with participants’ ability to predict price changes inmarkets
due the presence of informed insider traders in the market (Bru-
guier et al., 2010).
If activity isolated in dmPFC during bubble markets reflected
mentalizing ToM activity, then we would expect a measure of
neural signal change in that region during bubble markets to
be associated with individual-specific measures of ToM. To
test this hypothesis further, we retested a subset of participants
(n = 14) who had originally participated in the bubble experiment
using an online version of the eye gaze test to assess their ToM
skills (Baron Cohen et al., 2001). In this task, participants looked
at eye gazes and picked one of four terms that best described
the mental state of the person whose eyes were shown (see
Experimental Procedures). The task has correct answers, from
which we constructed an index of the ToM ability of each partic-
ipant. We then extracted the percentage of signal change in
dmPFC in response to CPV during bubble markets (in the
8 mm sphere centered at [9, 50, 28]) for each subject and found
a substantial correlation between that signal change and each
subject’s ToM ability index (Spearman rank correlation co-
efficient r = 0.57; p < 0.05) (Figure 4). Critically, no significant cor-
relation between dmPFC signal and the ToM index was found
during nonbubble markets (r = 0.32; p > 0.1). Furthermore, we
repeated the same analysis in vmPFC (in the 8 mm sphere
centered at [3, 53, 2]), which showed that activity in vmPFC
did not correlate with performance in the ToM task in either the
bubble (r = 0.06; p > 0.5) or the nonbubble markets (r = 0.09;
p > 0.5). Taken together, these findings supported our hypothe-
sis that the increased activity in dmPFC that we isolated during
the financial bubbles reflected a computation associated with
the participants’ tendency to make inferences about the mental
states of other players in the market. An intriguing possibility is
that participants during the financial bubble, rather than mental-
izing the intentions of individual players, would represent the
whole market as an intentional agent in the attempt to forecast
the future intentions of the market.
Notably, unlike in vmPFC, activity in dmPFC isolated in this
contrast did not correlate significantly (r = 0.009; p > 0.5) with
the individual’s susceptibility to ride a financial bubble, as
measured by the bubble susceptibility index. These results sug-
gested that the neural circuit that modulated the value represen-
tation in vmPFC (associated with the behavioral susceptibility to
ride a financial bubble) might be influenced by the social com-
putations instantiated in dmPFC during the update of partici-
pants’ CPV. In order to test this hypothesis, we then conducted
a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis between vmPFC
and dmPFC. This analysis revealed that the functional coupling
between these two regions significantly increased during bubble
markets (p < 0.001; Figure 5), suggesting that investors might
update their portfolio profits in vmPFC by taking into account
the intentions of the other players in the market. We therefore
devised a model-based analysis to investigate this idea in
more detail.
Intentionality
To study how intentionsmodulatemarket traders’ computations,
we studied how subjects inferred intentional agency fromron 79, 1222–1231, September 18, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 1225
Figure 2. Value Signals in vmPFC
(A) Increased response to parametric changes in
CPV in bubble markets versus nonbubble mar-
kets. vmPFC (peak [x, y, z] = [3, 53, 2]; Z = 3.02; p <
0.05 small volume FWE corrected) representation
of trading value is positively modulated in bubble
markets.
(B) Bar plot for the vmPFC response for three
levels of CPV (low, medium, high) for bubble
markets (red) and nonbubble markets (green).
Note that the bar plot is shown solely for illustrative
purposes (to clarify the signal pattern in vmPFC)
and is not used for statistical inference (which was
carried out in the SPM framework).
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Theory of Mind Biases Values in Financial Bubbleschanges in the arrival of buy and sell orders. Recall that subjects
see a fast-motion replay of all orders to buy (bids), and all orders
to sell (asks), whichwere entered in the original behavioral exper-
iments. Paying careful attention to this fine-grained sequence of
buy and sell orders could form a basis for predicting trader inten-
tions (a relative of sentiment in financial economics; Baker and
Wurgler, 2007). To translate this idea into a precise computa-
tional variable, we use a recent precise measure from financial
theory. The intuitive idea is that the presence of strategic agents
in a market can be inferred by a statistical change in the order
arrival process, from a homogeneous Poisson process to a
mixture process (where the arrival intensity switches randomly)
(Easley et al., 1997). The idea is that any increase in trader infor-
mation, or even a perception of such an increase, will change
order arrival. For example, orders may arrive more rapidly as
traders try to trade quickly before information leaks out, or orders
may thin out as traders place orders more cautiously, afraid of
being on the wrong end of a trade against a better-informed part-
ner (Easley et al., 2002).
We therefore constructed a statistic that measured the
dynamic of breaks in Poisson homogeneity during trading. We
called this metric Poisson inhomogeneity detector (PID). PID is
a statistic that increases as the evidence against a homogenous
Poisson order arrival process increases over the recent past.
Specifically, it tests whether the number of arrivals in the last in-
terval of 9 s conforms to a Poisson distribution with fixed arrival
intensity. This measure, first proposed and investigated by
Brown and Zhao (2002), has good statistical power (in small
samples) to reject the null hypothesis of homogenous arrival in
favor of the alternative that the arrival rates obtain from Poisson
distributions with different arrival rates across the M intervals.
Letting xi denote the number of arrivals in interval
iði = 1;.; MÞ, and
yi =

xi +
3
8
1=2
; (Equation 1)
then the PID is defined as
PID= 4
Xi
m
ðyðiÞ  YÞ2; (Equation 2)
where Y equals the average (across M intervals) of the values of
yi. Under the null hypothesis, PID approximately follows a c
2 dis-
tribution with M  1 degrees of freedom. Taking M = 24, this1226 Neuron 79, 1222–1231, September 18, 2013 ª2013 The Authormeans that the critical value corresponding to p = 0.05 is PID =
36. As PID grows, the evidence against the null hypothesis of
no change in arrival rate increases (Figure 6A; Figure S4).
Using this model, we were then able to construct a parametric
regressor for each subject, measuring inferred intention over
time. The regressor averaged the value of PID over the period
in which the subject observed the arrival of asks and bids in
the market (see Experimental Procedures).
Critically, this parametric regressor was uncorrelated with
either CPV (r = 0.06 ± 0.02) or the deviation in prices from the
fundamental values (r = 0.001 ± 0.09). Changes in PID were
then input as a parametric regressor in a general linear model
to test whether activity in vmPFC and dmPFC showed a greater
modulation to this metric during a contrast between bubble
markets versus nonbubble markets (analogously to the contrast
using CPV as modulator). We then extracted the signal in both
regions of interest (using an 8 mm sphere centered at [3, 53,
2] for vmPFC and [9, 50, 28] for dmPFC). This analysis yielded
a significant result in both regions in medial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC: t = 1.83, p < 0.05 and dmPFC: t = 1.77, p < 0.05). We
then tested how this activity in medial prefrontal cortex covaried
with the susceptibility to ride the bubble (i.e., correlation with
bubble susceptibility index). A significant correlation in most of
the medial prefrontal cortex (Figure 6B), including the two re-
gions of interest, vmPFC (r = 0.46; p < 0.001) and dmPFC (r =
0.68; p < 0.001), was isolated as a result of this analysis (Fig-
ure 6C; for a complete list of activations, see also Table S1).
DISCUSSION
Understanding why financial bubbles occur is a challenging
problem that has been intensively investigated, with no clear
results. Several scholars have recently started to explore the
neural mechanisms underpinning human behavior during finan-
cial interactions (Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007; Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005; 2011; Lohrenz et al., 2007), along with psycho-
physiological (Lo and Repin, 2002) and hormonal measures
(Coates and Herbert, 2008). However, nothing is known about
the neural computation underpinning traders’ behavior during
financial bubbles. Here, we show that neuroscientific data can
help make sense of market behavior that is anomalous for stan-
dard financial theory (Yu and Xiong, 2011) by emphasizing the
role played by traders’ theory of mind in artificially inflating the
value of portfolio profits.s
Figure 3. Bubble Susceptibility Index
(A) Activity in vmPFC is positively modulated by
the individual propensity to ride a financial bubble.
Between-subject regression analysis entering the
bubble susceptibility index (i.e., the extra price
paid by participants to purchase shares at prices
above the fundamental value during the whole
experiment) as a covariate for the increase in CPV
response during bubble markets in vmPFC (peak
[x, y, z] = 6, 50, 1; Z = 3; p < 0.05 small volume
FWE corrected).
(B) Scatter plot showing the parameter estimates
for each participant. Note that the scatter plot is
shown here solely for illustrative purposes (e.g.,
absence of outliers), and it is not used for statis-
tical inference (which was carried out in the SPM
framework).
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Theory of Mind Biases Values in Financial BubblesStandard asset pricing theory assumes that competitive mar-
kets are nonstrategic and nonintentional (i.e., payoffs depend
only on the price, which one cannot influence). On the contrary,
our behavioral results show that the explicit information carried
by prices and fundamental values accounts for significantly
less variance in choice behavior when subjects are trading in
bubble markets. When we tested how trading in bubble markets
modulated the representation of trading values in vmPFC, we
showed that these values are differentially represented in
vmPFC. More specifically, trading in the context of a financial
bubble is associated with inflated value representations in
vmPFC. Many studies show that vmPFC plays a key role in valu-
ation and goal-directed choices (Rangel et al., 2008; Boorman
et al., 2009; Chib et al., 2009; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Hare
et al., 2009; Levy and Glimcher, 2012). Contextual factors have
a powerful effect in modulating the neural representation of
goal values in vmPFC and therefore affect choice (Plassmann
et al., 2008; De Martino et al., 2009). For example, inflated value
representation in vmPFC has been previously shown to affect
prices, causing a behavior known as money illusion (Weber
et al., 2009). This behavior is associated with vmPFC tracking
the inflated nominal value evenwhen the actual purchasing value
remains unchanged.
Investigating changes in value representation in vmPFC, we
were able to show a correlation between the propensity to ride
a bubble (measured with the bubble susceptibility index) and
activity in this region. Note that in our experiment, participants
could ride the bubble, but not directly influence its formation,
due to the nature of the experimental design. However, this situ-
ation is analogous to real financial markets in which the action of
a single trader very rarely has a detectable impact on the whole
market. We then sought to clarify the role played in this process
by participants’ attempts to forecast the intentions of other
players or of the market as an intentional agent.
In fact, while standard financial theory assumes that compet-
itive markets are nonstrategic, it is not uncommon for people to
assign intentionality to markets. Financial commentators often
say, anthropomorphically, that ‘‘markets are panicking’’ or ‘‘mar-
kets are losing confidence.’’ Assigning intention or agency is a
natural way for humans to model and interpret complex behavior
(as in the case of simple societies in which human-like gods are
thought to control natural processes such as the weather). Hu-Neumans live in social environments and therefore usually benefit
from ToM abilities that allow them to forecast the intentions of
others and take preventive actions (Fehr and Camerer, 2007;
Frith and Frith, 1999; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Sanfey, 2007),
an ability instantiated in medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) (Amo-
dio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006).
Using an independent ToM task (Baron Cohen et al., 2001), we
showed that the increase of activity isolated during the bubble
markets correlates with the individual ability in ToM. Further-
more, we showed that the functional coupling between dmPFC
and vmPFC was increased during bubble markets. We inter-
preted these results by proposing a putative mechanism that
produces the increase in value sensitivity that we observed in
vmPFC while participants traded in the context of bubble mar-
kets. These data suggest that during financial bubbles, partici-
pants are taking into account the intention of other players in
the market (or of the market as whole) while updating their value
estimates, and that this effect is mediated by the interaction
between dmPFC and vmPFC. This interpretation fits with previ-
ous studies that have highlighted the role of dmPFC in shaping
value computation by showing that social signals change the
way in which values are updated through reinforcement learning
(Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008; Behrens et al., 2009;
Suzuki et al., 2012). For example, activity in dmPFC correlates
with the likelihood that participants playing a ‘‘work-or-shirk’’
strategic game learn the value of an action using a model that
takes into consideration the intentions of the other players in
the game (Hampton et al., 2008). A recent study by Nicolle and
colleagues (Nicolle et al., 2012) has proposed that dmPFC is
not specifically involved in mentalizing but has a more general
role in representing the values of actions that are modeled but
not executed while vmPFC is involved in representing only those
values that are relevant for the decision maker’s executed
choice. According to this framework, a complementary interpre-
tation of our results is that the activity in dmPFC reflects a
computation of value associated with modeled alternative
choices (e.g., buying at different prices from the fundamental
value) that are especially relevant for traders during bubble mar-
kets, when the price path is highly variable.
To provide further support to the hypothesis that the attempt
to forecast the intentions of other players or of the market plays
a key role in modulating the susceptibility to financial bubbles,ron 79, 1222–1231, September 18, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 1227
Figure 4. ToM Signals in dmPFC
(A) Increased response to parametric changes in
CPV in bubble markets versus nonbubble mar-
kets. dmPFC (peak [x, y, z] = 9, 50, 28; Z = 3.44; p <
0.05 small volume FWE corrected) is positively
modulated in bubble markets.
(B) Percentage of signal change extracted in this
region (8 mm sphere) during bubble markets
positively correlates (Spearman rank correlation
coefficient r = 0.57; p < 0.05) with the ToM eye
score collected for a subset of participants (n = 14)
in a subsequent behavioral study. Notably, no
significant correlation between ToM score and
activity in dmPFC was isolated in nonbubble
market conditions (r = 0.32; p > 0.1).
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Theory of Mind Biases Values in Financial Bubbleswe devised a new statistic, the PID, to interrogate our neural data
using a model-based approach. The rationale behind this
analysis was suggested by recent financial models that have
proposed that the presence of intentionality in the market (i.e.,
strategic agents in financial terms) can be inferred by changes
in the order arrival process from a homogeneous Poisson pro-
cess to a mixture process whereby orders arrive in clusters, fol-
lowed by periods of unusually low activity (as if traders were
holding their breath). Finance theory (Easley et al., 1997) and
some experimental evidence (Camerer and Weigelt, 1991) sug-
gest that a change in order arrival indicates the presence of
traders who are better informed or who are perceived to be
better informed. Therefore, the PID statistic can be considered
a measure of the intensity of the perceived winner’s curse and
hence of inferred intention in the marketplace. Note that even
in the absence of strategic players in the market, it is sufficient
that participants perceive (and believe) that there are agents
with an information advantage, i.e., that there are agents who
make better guesses about when a bubble may crash (Abreu
and Brunnermeier, 2003). This metric allowed us to measure if
activity in vmPFC and dmPFC was positively modulated during
bubble markets in response to change in the level of perceived
intentionality in these markets.
It is important to highlight that while the PID statistic shows
fluctuations in the nonbubble markets too (primarily in the initial
periods in which bids are below the fundamental value, a stan-
dard feature of all types of experimental markets), activity in
these prefrontal regions specifically responds to change in inten-
tionality (perceived or real) during the bubble markets, a type of
market in which the fundamental values are not sufficient to pre-
dict the future evolution of prices.
Our analyses showed that both regions were positively modu-
lated by the PID parameter during bubblemarkets and that activ-
ity in the dorsal and ventral regions of the medial prefrontal
cortex showed a positive modulation with the susceptibility to
ride financial bubbles. It is worth noting that the PID parameter
is orthogonal to the CPV parameter used in the first analysis,
so the PID analysis is likely to pick up different computational
processes carried out by the same regions. Taken together,
these data provide further support that forecasting intention
plays a key role in modulating the regions in medial prefrontal
cortex that we have identified to be involved in ToM and value
computation during the representation of trading values in finan-
cial bubbles. However, the exact way in which these different1228 Neuron 79, 1222–1231, September 18, 2013 ª2013 The Authorcomputations interact to shape behavior needs to be investi-
gated in further detail using tailored experimental paradigms.
We also want to emphasize that our study does not exclude
the possibility that other mechanisms (such as anticipatory
affective response), which have been demonstrated to lead to
financial mistakes (Wu et al., 2012, Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005), might also play a pivotal role in the formation of bubbles.
Financial bubbles are complex and multidimensional phenom-
ena, and the identification of the neural mechanisms under-
pinning their formation requires the combination of a number
of different approaches.
In conclusion, in this study we showed how the same com-
putational mechanisms that have been extremely advantageous
in our evolutionary history (such as the one that allows people to
take into account the intentions of other agents when computing
values) could result in maladaptive behaviors when interacting
with complex modern institutions like financial markets. How-
ever, it must be noted that these abilities are not always
maladaptive in a financial milieu. For example, traders can suc-
cessfully use their ToMabilities to detect the presence of insiders
in the market (Bruguier et al., 2010), inducing traders to become
more cautious in order to avoid being taken advantage of by a
better-informed trading partner and improving the estimation
of prices. Overall, our work suggests that a neurobiological
account of trading behavior (Bossaerts, 2009) that takes into
account theory of mind can provide a mechanistic explanation
of financial concepts such as limited-rationality investing (Fehr
and Camerer, 2007). The insights that this study gives into the
underlying computational mechanisms that lead to bubble for-
mation can also potentially benefit policymakers in designing
more efficient social and financial institutions.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Twenty-six undergraduate and graduate Caltech students took part in the orig-
inal 2-day scanning study. Because of potential gender differences in financial
and social behavior (Powell and Ansic, 1997; Eckel and Grossman, 2008;
Byrnes et al., 1999; Bertrand, 2011), the study included males only. Five sub-
jects were excluded from the analysis because of technical problems at the
time of the scanning or excessive head movements.
fMRI task
Trading activity in six actual experimental markets (collected in previous
behavioral studies; Porter and Smith, 2003) was replayed over a 2 days
Figure 5. Functional Connectivity of
vmPFC-dmPFC
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis
between dmPFC (seed) and vmPFC (target) during
bubble markets. The bar plot shows how activity in
vmPFC (8mmsphere centered at6, 50, 1) shows
an increased functional coupling with dmPFC
during bubble markets (p < 0.001). Error bars
represent SEM.
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Theory of Mind Biases Values in Financial Bubblesscanning schedule. Three of the markets used in the study were nonbubble
markets; in these markets, the market prices closely tracked the fundamental
value of the asset. The other threemarkets were bubblemarkets, in whichmar-
ket prices rose well above the intrinsic value (see Figure S1). On each day, the
participants traded in three experimental markets selected in a pseudorandom
order (to avoid three consecutive markets of the same type being presented in
the same day). The duration of each market was approximately 15 min. Partic-
ipants started each new session with a cash endowment of $60 and zero
shares. Each market was divided into fifteen trading periods. At the beginning
of each period, participants were shown a message stating the period number
and the value of their portfolio (shares and cash). This was followed by a video
showing an intuitive graphical replay of the order (asks and bids) and trade
flow. The scanned participants observed a fast-motion visual representation
of the prices of offers to sell (asks) and offers to buy (bids), which were actually
inputted by the participants who had taken part in the original behavioral ex-
periments. The orders were arranged by price level (see illustrative diagram
on the right corner of Figure 1). Whenever a trade occurred, the best bid (if a
sale) or best ask (if a purchase) briefly (0.5 s) changed color to green, after
which the circle disappeared. The circles constantly rearranged to ensure
that the best bid and ask circles were closest to the midpoint of the screen
(this graphical representation of the trades was a modification of an fMRI
task used by Bruguier and collegues (Bruguier et al., 2010). After a variable
time interval (3–6 s), the screen was frozen for 5 s, and participants used their
initial endowment of $60 to either buy or sell (1, 2, or 3 shares) or stay by press-
ing a keypad. The intervals in which choices were made (choice intervals) were
presented 2–3 times during each of the 15 periods composing each market.
After the choice was inputted (5 s choice interval), an update of the partici-
pant’s portfolio (number of the shares held and cash) was presented on the
screen. At the end of each period (15 periods in total for each market), a divi-
dend was randomly extracted from a uniform distribution of (0¢ 8¢ 28¢ 60¢),
and participants were then paid for the number of shares held. Participants
were also allowed to short sell shares for a total maximum of 52 shares. In
cases of short selling, participants had to pay the cost of the dividend for
the number of negative shares held. At the end of each period, the dividend
for that period was displayed to the participants with an update of their port-
folio. For full instructions given to the participants’ in advance of the experi-
ment, please see Appendix 1 in the Supplemental Information.
ToM Task
All participants that took part in the original experiment were contacted via
e-mail and asked to complete an online modification of the eye gaze ToM
task (Baron Cohen et al., 2001). Seven of the twenty-one participants that
took part in the original fMRI study did not respond to our request. The remain-
ing fourteen participants who did complete the online testing received a $10
Amazon voucher as compensation. During the test, participants were shown
36 photographs of eye gazes in a consecutive sequence, and they were asked
to pick one term from four possible descriptions of the personwhose eyeswere
portrayed in the photo (for example, anxious, thoughtful, skeptical, suspicious).
Behavioral Analyses
Behavioral analyses were performed using Matlab statistical toolbook and
SPSS. Ordered logistic regression was implemented using the PLUM (polyto-
mous universal model) procedure in SPSS (DeCarlo, 2003). The dependentNeuvariables were the participants’ choices coded as trinary variables (i.e., buy,
sell, or stay), while the two dependent measures were market prices (average
of best bid and best ask available in the choice period) and fundamental asset
value for the current period ($0.243 [15 t + 1]) (dashed line in Figures 1C and
1D). For each model, we reported the Nagelkerke pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke,
1991) and the BIC (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
Scanning Acquisition
Forty-five slices were acquired on a 3T Siemens Trio at a resolution of 3 mm3
3 mm 3 3 mm, providing whole-brain coverage. A single-shot echo planar
imaging (EPI) pulse sequence was used (TR = 2800 ms, TE = 30 ms, FOV =
100 mm, flip angle = 80). The images were collected at a tilted angle of 30
from the anterior commissure. For each subject, at the end of the first scanning
day (day 1), the EPI functional scanning was followed by a whole-brain, high-
resolution, T1-weighted anatomical structural scan and local field maps.
fMRI-SPM Analyses
Image analysis was performed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/). The first five volumes from each session were discarded to allow for
T1 equilibration. Raw functional, structural, and field map files were recon-
structed using TBR. Field maps were reconstructed into a single-phase file.
This field map file was then used to realign and unwarp EPI functional images.
Structural images were reregistered to mean EPI images and segmented into
gray and white matter. These segmentation parameters were then used to
normalize and bias correct the functional images. Normalized images were
smoothed using an 8 mm full-width Gaussian kernel at half-maximum
(FWHM). A GLM was constructed in which onset regressors (beginning at
the start of each video) for each session were assembled by convolving d func-
tions with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). These regres-
sors were modulated by a parametric regressor coding for the CPV, a combi-
nation of the value in cash and in shares held by a subject at each point in time
(CPV = cash + [shares3 fundamental value at time t]). A correction for tempo-
ral autocorrelation in the data (AR 1 + white noise) was applied. Finally, six mo-
tion parameters were included in the GLM. In order to find an interaction of the
increased value representation due to the bubble manipulation, we contrasted
linear increase to CPV in the bubble markets versus the nonbubble markets.
To test the role of ToM in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, we extracted activ-
ity from an 8 mm sphere region of interest (ROI) centered in dmPFC [9, 50, 28]
isolated in the whole brain SPM analysis. We then tested how activity that
parametrically tracked the increase in CPV correlated with individual ToM
scores during bubble markets and nonbubble markets, calculating Spear-
man’s rank correlation coefficient between the parameter estimates in dmPFC
and ToM scores. For the analysis using the PID, we calculated this metric (as
described in the Results) for each time point in the original markets used as
stimuli for the fMRI study. We then averaged the PID over the period of movie
observed by each participant and used this parameter in a new GLM. We then
contrasted this parametric regressor in the bubble markets versus the non-
bubble markets and extract activity of two ROIs of 8 mm sphere centered in
dmPFC [9, 50, 28] and vmPFC [3, 53, 2].
fMRI-PPI Analysis
To assess changes in connectivity between dmPFC and vmPFC as a function
of the market type, we carried out a psychophysiological interaction (PPI)ron 79, 1222–1231, September 18, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 1229
Figure 6. Poisson Inhomogeneity Detector
Signals
(A) Poisson inhomogeneity detector (PID) evolving
over time for the two types of markets (bubble and
nonbubble) depicted in Figures 1C and 1D. This
metric captures the inferred change in evidence (at
p = 0.05) for a switch from a homogeneous Pois-
son process in the arrival of orders (gray box) to a
mixture process, in which arrival intensity changes
randomly.
(B) Response in medial prefrontal cortex to para-
metric changes in PID in bubble markets versus
nonbubble markets, which is positively modulated
by the individual propensity to ride a financial
bubble. The scatter plot shows the parameter
estimates for each participant in the dmPFC and
vmPFC ROIs. The scatter plot is solely for illus-
trative purposes (e.g., to show the absence of
outliers), and it is not used for statistical inference.
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Theory of Mind Biases Values in Financial Bubblesanalysis. PPI is a measure of context-dependent connectivity, explaining the
regional activity of other brain regions (here vmPFC) in terms of the interaction
between responses in a seed region (here dmPFC) and a cognitive or sensory
process. We carried out PPI analysis using the generalized PPI toolbox for
SPM (gPPI; http://www.nitrc.org/projects/gppi). gPPI creates a new GLM in
which the deconvolved activity of the seed region (8 mm sphere centered in
dmPFC [9, 50, 28]) is assigned to the regressors modeling the effect of the
task at the time of the trading periods and reconvolved with the hemodynamic
response function. Average time courses were extracted from all voxels within
an 8 mm sphere surrounding the vmPFC peak coordinate [3, 53, 2] that we
isolated in the original SPM analysis. This was done since the aim of this anal-
ysis was to demonstrate that the activity we isolated in dmPFC and vmPFC (in
the main SPM contrast) showed a functional connectivity. The main effects of
the task, seed region time course, andmotion parameters were included as re-
gressors of no interest. The PPI contrast compares bubble markets (+1) with
nonbubble markets (1).
Statistical Inference
Second-level group contrasts from our GLM were calculated as a one-sample
t test against zero for each first-level linear contrast. Activations were reported
as significant if they survived familywise error correction (FWE) for multiple
comparisons across a volume of 8 mm (SVC) cantered on peak of activity iso-
lated in independent studies. For vmPFC, we used the coordinates [0, 53, 4]
taken from (Suzuki et al., 2012); for dmPFC, we used the coordinates [3,
51, 24] taken from (Hampton et al., 2008).
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